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Abstract In this paper, we use quantile regression analysis to explore the
role submarket competition plays in setting housing prices in
those price ranges where different submarkets occupy homes of
similar price. We ﬁnd evidence of direct competition between
submarkets with different preferences for at least some homes
in a single neighborhood. By examining hedonic parameter
instability at different housing price levels, we uncover not only
latent diversity among homeowners but direct competition
between them, which calls into question policy and market
conclusions drawn from standard hedonic price models,
especially large sample hedonic studies.
Urban diversity is increasing, not decreasing. The very premise of New Urbanism
relies on the creation of stable, diverse neighborhoods (Florida, 2008, 2005).
Indeed capitalizing on such diversity is the intent of new trends in urban design.
So, if developers and policymakers are to commit scarce capital to these
development initiatives, real estate professionals need to be able to evaluate the
structure of local submarkets to anticipate who likely will occupy a particular
space. A critical concern is to identify those features that cause a unit to shift
ownership from one submarket to another; this requires a deep understanding of
the local economic conditions that govern local real estate occupancy patterns. To
put this in perspective, at the other end of the spectrum research can seek to
explain house price variation in a more regional context (Osland, Thorsen, and
Gitlesen, 2007).
Relatively recent work involving quasi-experiments has appeared in the American
Economic Review (e.g., Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008) to note that small changes in
a neighborhood-wide attribute can result in the resorting of different types into
that neighborhood and out of that neighborhood, after which the marginal value
of the attribute changes signiﬁcantly even though no other features changed. That,
of course, signals that a different type of household now occupies the residence.
Interestingly, a single regression with many attributes over a large geographic
space that shows very high signiﬁcance, low multicollinearity, and a high R2436  Farmer and Lipscomb
statistic still failed to capture the true price effect of this attribute change,
producing inconsistent attribute estimates. This suggests that it is difﬁcult to
analyze submarket effects on price within a single neighborhood from a single-
line regression model.
There are numerous beneﬁts to applied real estate economics of modeling the
local market details, diversity, and competition among diverse households as we
do in this work. The beneﬁts of this line of inquiry penetrate ground level attribute
studies as well as real estate macro-market studies, most of which seem to call
for greater household differentiation. For example, Seo and Simons (2009) note
the effect of school quality on housing prices. Cast in our approach, we expect
that submarket identiﬁcation might sharpen this effect (e.g., telling us what new
types might be moving into neighborhoods with higher quality schools). In
addition, the greater detail that we propose could provide insight to see if one
type ever pays a premium for school quality to resolve its competition with another
type. This not only allows developers to improve homes for a given household
type in anticipation of a premium paid for an improvement in local school quality,
but such market segmentation and detail would be important for shaping local
education outreach programs as well.
Shultz and Schmitz (2009) also note considerable variation in the price effect of
golf courses and recommend hedonic analyses that are more ‘‘course speciﬁc.’’
Much of this is surely due to course quality. For their research, our present work
suggests that speciﬁc residential composition (as course quality or characteristics
change) may be able to explain some of the variation detected for an amenity.
Even Shultz and Schmitz note that residential composition is not as homogeneous
as ﬁrst impressions suggest.
At a more intermediate level, concerns to examine larger real estate market trends
can be improved by sharper submarket contextualization in real estate pricing. For
example, meta-analyses of hedonic research studies are used by various federal
agencies to set policy. A meta-analysis conducted by Simons and Saginor (2006)
seeks an average response across 75 different papers. Our analysis suggests that
a lack of ﬁner detail will tend to suppress the magnitudes of the negative effects
of ‘bads’ (such as environmental contamination) or the positive effects of ‘goods’
(such as environmental amenities), potentially directing national policy away from
stronger positions on these issues.
At a macro-market level, we also see the growing need for market stratiﬁcation
in policy and market analyses (Prasad and Richards, 2008), where movements in
the real estate macro-market are affected by the relative level of current activity
among distinct market segments. In a similar vein, Miles (2008) uses generalized
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models to show that
across states the signs and magnitudes of explanatory variables vary widely,
highlighting the importance of estimating separate GARCH models for each
individual market.Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  437
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 Submarket Competition
In diverse urban districts, some households bid for housing units only among
members of their own submarket. The house may not appeal to another submarket;
one reason might be that income constraints prevent members of a submarket
from offering competitive bids. This would make market segmentation an easier
process to identify. Yet, within some price ranges in many diverse urban
neighborhoods, households may compete with other submarkets for a given unit.
Cross-submarket competition in a local area, if vigorous, is likely to leave a unique
empirical mark on home prices in a local area. If a marginal improvement in a
single attribute or a collection of related attributes induces cross-type competition
for a given unit, theory suggests cross-type competition more often will require a
premium to be paid to acquire that unit. If the submarket agent is attracted to the
unit because of a marginal improvement in a speciﬁc class of attributes and is
successful, the overall price for this unit will reﬂect a higher implicit value for
that attribute. If sales from different competitive conditions are incorporated into
the same regression that assumes homogeneous agents, the structural differences
that could explain the price movements would appear merely as higher overall
variance and, potentially, could lead to inconsistent attribute estimates. This work
addresses a case where variation in home prices locally includes substantial cross-
submarket competition.
We do not attempt to create an estimator to extract a fully efﬁcient market estimate
of this competition signal from other noise, in part because in this initial
exploratory study the data set is quite small. Instead, we test for the presence of
variance (in a small neighborhood) that is consistent with a hypothesis that cross-
submarket competition exists and that price premiums are being paid to occupy a
unit that does not exist in other price ranges where cross-type competition is
unlikely. That is to say, we expect this neighborhood to accommodate multiple
household types (with different preferences) that compete with each other for
housing. What we ﬁnd is that, in the price ranges where submarkets might
compete against each other for housing, certain hedonic attributes consistently
show higher values above the mean than in other price ranges. As a result, some
of the overall price variation is, we hypothesize, explained directly by this
competition between types; and cross-market competition appears to be resolved
(i.e., one household type ends up occupying the house as it outbids another
household type) when one type offers a premium for an attribute of particular
interest.
The attributes that display a premium in the price ranges where competition occurs
between types are those that appear to be especially important to that type given
prior analysis of this local real estate market (Lipscomb and Farmer, 2005). For
example, the new and expensive houses that are occupied by undergraduate
students (renters) have more bedrooms, smaller square footage per room, yet large438  Farmer and Lipscomb
square footage overall than the homes purchased by established households
(mostly owners) in the neighborhood in this same price range. Established
households in this price range reﬂect a strong preference for adjacency factors,
meaning members of this submarket pay a premium for the composition of
immediate and near neighbors. In the price ranges where student housing and
established homes realize the same sales price, the value of structural attributes
for students and adjacency attributes for established households realizes a
premium, suggesting they at times directly compete and submit bids for the same
units. Overall, the elements of these broad attribute classes are strong features in
the existing analysis of this market. To be answered in this work is whether the
signiﬁcance of these attribute classes could be explained in part by bidding
behavior between submarkets. Understanding this structure better is important for
setting local land use policy, for larger development or redevelopment efforts, and
for estimating damages in real estate contamination cases.
The evidence in this work that students and established households may in fact
engage in direct competition (bidding for the same unit in this price range) is
displayed by an extraordinary price premium for high occupancy structural
features by students and a high premium related to adjacency features by
established households, limited to the price range where competition is possible.
This is identiﬁed by a quantile regression analysis on each submarket that
estimates a different coefﬁcient vector for attributes at different price ranges
(quantiles). Without a premium, the co-existence of two submarkets occupying
homes in the same price range may be coincidental; or the different submarkets
sort into different units in an orderly fashion without ever directly competing for
the same units. When these two groups do bid for the same house, however, one
group appears to pay a premium for the particular feature that they most value.
This is consistent with offering more for an improvement in those attributes than
they have to pay otherwise, consistent with auction theory.
Prior work on this dataset (Lipscomb and Farmer, 2005) also suggests the
possibility that the entry and exit of a given type in a neighborhood can be
sensitive to speciﬁc features, an outcome any investor needs to anticipate in
building (or improving) real estate for a given market. A third group of young
professionals, for example, does enter the neighborhood in a very narrow price
range. Prior evidence suggests they occupy units that are almost universally two-
bedroom, one-bath units. One explanation is that if a bedroom or bath is added,
this submarket group is quickly outbid by another type. Direct inspection only
located these young professionals occupying units ofﬁcially listed as 3 bedroom
or 2 bath homes when those rooms were largely below standard or unsuitable for
their listed purpose. Prior work speculated that this might be responsible for
negative and signiﬁcant values for the number of bathrooms variable (Lipscomb
and Farmer, 2005). Generally, this hypothesized result is only possible if there is
active cross-submarket trading, without which we would have an uncorrupted data
array that would observe marginal value gains for another bedroom or bath ofUsing Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  439
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moderate to good quality. That this is obviated by the absence of observations of
this type occupying residences improved in such a manner suggests that cross-
type bidding is present and that this type is usually outbid. Yet this speculation
still has to be tested. Corroborating evidence found here has strong implications
for investment and redevelopment potential in this neighborhood. Improving units
currently occupied by households from this submarket can realize the very high
premium paid by an occupant from another submarket, an opportunity otherwise
undetectable by conventional hedonic analysis.
Who occupies particular dwellings is decided by the highest bid for the particular
characteristics of each dwelling. Critically, analyses that model limited
heterogeneity will miss this effect. In critical, strategic land use decisions or
investments this could have deleterious effects, resulting in investment losses or
poor zoning choices. Neighborhood zoning, for example, often prizes homogeneity
as a form of continuity. Yet the implications of possible outcomes presented here
for real estate developers and remodelers are important, especially in discussions
concerning neighborhood redevelopment and New Urbanism principles (Bohl,
2000).
 Auction Theory
So why would different household types have to pay a premium for certain
characteristics? Auction theory offers a theoretical base for this observed
phenomenon. In a Vickrey (1961) auction, a successful bidder only has to outbid
the second highest bidder. This is important because ﬁnal auction prices generally
do not extract the entire consumers’ surplus of the highest bidder. The ﬁnal
occupant pays something below her highest willingness to pay, outbidding the
second highest bidder only by some small incremental amount. If the second
highest bidder has similar preferences to the highest bidder, and the second highest
bidder is representative of buyers in this market across a regional (or
neighborhood) market, hedonic prices for attributes will be quite stable, reﬂecting
the common preferences of this group. The idiosyncratic preferences of each
individual will not be reﬂected in the ﬁnal market prices, so hedonic analyses are
quite stable.
But, what happens when another type of household is attracted to bid for a unit?
If two different types compete for a unit in a particular price range, the second
highest bidder now may have very different preferences than the second highest
bidder’s active in other price ranges. If that other household type offers a credible
competitive bid that eliminates all other competitors, it becomes the second
highest bidder in that auction. Some of the surplus that the successful occupant
would have enjoyed by outbidding only a member of the same submarket will
have to be sacriﬁced. Therefore, the successful occupant will offer an additional
premium to assure her successful bid over the new contender, a second highest
bidder from another submarket.440  Farmer and Lipscomb
In such a market competition, sometimes one type will win and sometimes
another. Small nuances in the attribute mix may resolve which group
representative wins. Each will offer a premium, reducing some of the surplus
typically received, to enjoy a particular feature of the house that reﬂects their
preferences. For example, if established households prefer a large yard, then we
might observe a premium being paid through the hedonic coefﬁcient on the
variable that measures a parcel’s lot size for these sales in this price range. These
particular house features and the premiums paid for them ought to show up as
higher hedonic coefﬁcient estimates within those speciﬁc prices ranges (price
quantiles) where two different types are observed in the market.
Indeed, using the quantile regression methodology, which allows regression
coefﬁcient values to vary across the price range, we ﬁnd premiums paid for
speciﬁc attributes only in those ranges where cross-type competition could
occur—homes of similar price occupied by different types of households in the
same neighborhood. These premiums manifest as higher implicit prices in these
speciﬁc price ranges across the submarkets. This suggests that some of the price
variation observed, even in very local markets, is due to the competition between
types for some houses but not for others, leaving a trace in the overall price data
as added and unexplained variation in the hedonic price estimates for each
individual submarket. If the researcher is not sorting submarkets and not
examining trade or competitions between submarkets, much of the richness of the
real estate market goes missing from hedonic analysis.
 Bidding Theory and Estimating Hedonic Prices
Diversity generates three concerns that need to be addressed empirically which
stem from the need to account for market activities among different submarkets.
Real estate analysts need to:
1. Sort groups into coherent types that satisfy statistical tests of submarket
sorting;
2. Cluster attributes into indexes of variables to manage multi-collinearity;
and
3. Estimate the effect of competition on home price data to detail those
particular attribute packages that resolve cross-submarket competitions
and that predict the ﬁnal occupant.
To date concern ‘1’ has been attempted by many different authors (Goodman and
Thibodeau 1998, 2003, 2007; Bourassa, Hamelink, Hoesli, and MacGregor, 1999;
Bourassa, Hoesli, and Peng 2003; Lipscomb and Farmer, 2005). In the majority
of these works, submarkets are assumed to correlate to geographic location,
governed by a one neighborhood, one type hypothesis. Concern ‘2’ has been
attempted by Kain and Quigley (1970), who use factor analysis to reduce theUsing Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  441
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number of location characteristics into a more manageable set of ﬁve factors, as
well as by Dubin and Sung (1990), who group neighborhood characteristics into
three categories: socioeconomic status, quality of municipal services, and racial
composition.
As far as we can tell, concern ‘3’ has not been addressed in the real estate or
urban economics literatures at the local level, nor have all three concerns been
addressed simultaneously. A recent trend in the literature is to conduct quasi-
experiments on the ‘voting with your feet’ thesis. Premised on homogeneity in a
single neighborhood, households re-sort among neighborhoods in a Tiebout-style
fashion after a signiﬁcant neighborhood characteristic changes (Smith and Huang,
1995; Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf, and Walsh, 2004; Cameron and McConnaha, 2006;
Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008; and Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 2008). Yet the diversity
between neighborhoods still relies on the acknowledged modeling convenience of
homogeneity within the neighborhood (Cameron and McConnaha, 2006). The
local homogeneity simpliﬁcation assures that all bidders in a home sale are drawn
from the same submarket which makes for orderly for hedonic estimation (Smith
and Huang, 1995; Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf, and Walsh, 2004). It has been noted that
such ‘vertical’ heterogeneity assumptions that attribute all diversity to spatial
delineation—one neighborhood, one type—implicitly assume for estimation that
two truly distinct types never directly compete for the same housing unit. These
works need to be augmented by ‘horizontal’heterogeneity where some individuals
with different, truly distinct marginal valuations offer similar overall values for a
home (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008; Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 2008).
Switch points (where one type replaces another in a given housing unit) are likely
to be inﬂuenced by classes of related attributes, at least under the premises of
household production theory. For example, location within the neighborhood is
one class of attributes that comprises proximities to several key landmarks (e.g.,
commercial/retail shopping, highway interchanges, green spaces). Also, a
structure bundle comprises structural attributes such as the number of bedrooms
and baths, among others. Therefore, tracking competition between submarkets is
facilitated by combining several related attributes into a coherent attribute bundle,
or index, that is consistent with the very origins and base theory of hedonic pricing
(Smith and Huang, 1995).
As so much of the public policy and private investment process is directed at the
local level (when diversity is present in a single neighborhood), hedonic price
analysis requires vetting multicollinearity among attributes that contribute to
similar household services and cross-submarket competition. Our goal in this work
is to extend previous literature that establishes local diversity in order to test for
the presence of local market forces that allocate homes across competing
submarkets. Results suggest that diversity itself and the cross-submarket
competition for housing units in this local market explain a signiﬁcant share of
home price variation.442  Farmer and Lipscomb
Below we conduct hedonic price analysis in a single neighborhood, which is part
of two different census tracts. Lipscomb and Farmer (2005) show that the
neighborhood market sorts rather cleanly into three distinct submarkets that value
bundles of attributes quite differently. Critically, the largest share of home price
variation is explained, ﬁrst, by sorting households into different submarkets, not
the aggregate variation of attributes across the neighborhood. In this work, we
identify additional variation in price that can be explained by the effects of cross
submarket competition. Variation is due to more than simple co-existence of
separate submarkets in one neighborhood. Home pricing patterns reﬂect predicted
variation in attribute bundles’ implicit values consistent with very different types
offering similar values for the same housing unit.
 Adapting Estimation to Submarket Competition
To extract information about the structure of a local market due to cross-type
competition, we need more information on households directly, speciﬁcally their
demographic information. First, a brief survey of households was conducted to
elicit very basic demographic data and a few key attitudinal variables that report
households’ impressions of their houses and their neighborhood. Second,
submarkets were identiﬁed through a sorting mechanism using household
information. The iterative sorting process that utilizes the seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) estimator had been employed already to sort households into
types (Lipscomb and Farmer, 2005). The SUR is the classical statistical tool
to manage differentiated types of economic actors in a single market, such
as submarkets buying and selling homes in a given area (Srivastava and Giles,
1987).
With submarkets identiﬁed, property attributes within a submarket were bundled,
or indexed, into three attribute classes. We bundled a structural attribute among
square footage, number of rooms, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, lot size,
and presence of a building permit. We created a location attribute index composed
of different distances of each home to surrounding landmarks. In this way,
different submarkets reveal a different best, or optimal, location within their
neighborhood. Finally, there is an adjacency attribute index composed of the
weights assigned to the concentrations of different types of households that occupy
residences in the immediate vicinity. Then, to isolate those price ranges (or
quantiles) where submarkets might compete for the same unit, we identiﬁed those
ranges where home prices in any two of the submarkets were similar. To test the
hypothesis that premiums are paid for attribute bundles in these price ranges by
certain household types, quantile regression analyses estimated different parameter
values for each attribute bundle (Structure, Location, and Adjacency) for each
submarket at different price quantiles.Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  443
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Attribute bundling, coupled with a quantile regression analysis, allows the
researcher to examine the structure of the market and to answer this question:
When two submarkets bid for the same housing unit, is there evidence that some
attribute bundle realizes a higher than average implicit hedonic price (i.e., a price
premium) by from one submarket that allows it to outbid the other submarket?
That evidence would allow the local real estate professional, developer, or urban
planner to make more strategically informed decisions and to examine the overall
economic stability of a diverse New Urbanism community.
The reason for quantile regression (QR) is that not all price ranges will be subject
to cross-submarket competition. Logically, only units similar in price for both
submarkets are candidates for competitive bidding between submarkets. So
empirically we need to track implicit prices for speciﬁc attribute bundles in those
price ranges where two submarkets overlap. In this way we can assess if any
above average premium is paid for either structural features, adjacency features,
or location features to outbid a contender from another submarket.
 Data and Methods
Quality data are critical to this study. Household data were acquired from direct
stated preference surveys coupled with Multiple Listing Service data. For the
renters in the dataset, monthly rental values were adjusted to market sales
equivalents using capitalization rates (or rent multipliers) supplied by local real
estate agents and validated against existing sales. Prior results suggest that it takes
only very modest demographic information about housing occupants to ascertain
how submarkets sort across a local space. As such, hedonic price analysis can
assist with submarket demarcation at a small geographic scale.
Analyses on the dataset already have partitioned households into three statistically
distinct submarkets (Lipscomb and Farmer, 2005; Lipscomb, 2006), each of which
has fundamentally different preferences. Type A households are generally low
income student renters completing university degrees; Type B households are
young adults, mostly graduate students with families or professionals in their early
career stages. These residents either rent or own lower-end starter dwellings. Type
C households are more established homeowners with incomes below the average
for the immediate downtown area who seek affordable urban housing in this
community.1 Exhibit 1 lists the descriptive statistics for variables used in the
construction of the attribute bundles.
Attribute Bundling
Using results for each submarket obtained from Lipscomb and Farmer (2005), we
create three attribute indexes using the hedonic coefﬁcients from the 14 original
independent variables:444  Farmer and Lipscomb
Exhibit 1  Variable List
Dependent Variable
Rental/Selling price of house; continuous in dollars; rental multiplier of 120 used to convert
monthly rents to sales prices.
Mean  148115; Standard Deviation  69400
Independent Variables
Dwelling Structure Variables (from housing survey, Multiple Listing Service, and City of Atlanta
construction database):
Square footage of the house; continuous
Mean  1323; Standard Deviation  502
Number of bedrooms; discrete
Mean  2.38; Standard Deviation  0.74
Number of baths; discrete
Mean  1.34; Standard Deviation  0.53
Number of acres; continuous
Mean  0.21; Standard Deviation  0.18
‘‘Have you taken out a building permit in the last three years?’’; discrete
Mean  0.12; Standard Deviation  .32
Condominium; discrete
Mean  0.06; Standard Deviation  0.24
Location Variables (from GIS)
Road network distance to nearest brown industry; continuous in meters
Mean  863; Standard Deviation  321
Road network distance to the Home Park green space; continuous in meters
Mean  532; Standard Deviation  264
Road network distance to 14th Street commercial/retail center; continuous in meters
Mean  922; Standard Deviation  391
‘‘Is the dwelling at or above street level?’’; dichotomous
Mean  0.38; Standard Deviation  0.48
Adjacency Variables (Yes or No dummy variables created from a GIS)
‘‘Do you live adjacent to a renter?’’
Mean  0.82; Standard Deviation  0.38
‘‘Do you live adjacent to a college student?’’
Mean  019; Standard Deviation  0.39
‘‘Do you live adjacent to a college graduate?’’
Mean  0.76; Standard Deviation  0.42
‘‘Do you live adjacent to a household that has made home improvements in the last two years?’’
Mean  0.33; Standard Deviation  0.47Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  445
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qqq ˆˆˆ STRUCTUREq   ln(SQFT)   ln(BEDS)   ln(BATHS) 123
qq q ˆˆ ˆ   ln(ACRES)   BLDGPERM   CONDO 45 6
qq ˆˆ LOCATIONq   ln(DC O M M 14)   ln(D GREEN) 78
qq ˆˆ   ln(D MEINEKE)   ln(STREET LEVEL) 91 0
qq ˆˆ ADJACENCYq   ln(ADJ RENTER)   ln(ADJ UGRAD) 11 12
q ˆ   ln(ADJ COLLEDUC) 13
q ˆ   ln(ADJ HOMEIMPROVE). 14 (1)
The STRUCTURE index for example is created using the coefﬁcient estimates 1
through 6 for each submarket q as index weights. The weighted indexes are group
speciﬁc, drawing values of 1 through 6 (or different weights) from each
submarket regression.2 See Exhibit 1 for a summary.
For this work, we regress the natural log of sales price [ln(Price)] for each
submarket q against the three newly created index variables. Notice that the
dependent variable and the indexes are log transformed to extract scale neutral
coefﬁcient estimates; or the estimated coefﬁcients of each attribute bundle iq
measure the percentage change in housing price due to a 1% change in the overall
value of the index for that attribute for that submarket.3 Three submarket
regressions are then estimated:
ˆˆ LN(PRICE)     STRUCTURE   LOCATION qo q1qq 2qq
ˆ   ADJACENCY   . (2) 3qq q
Results for the submarket regressions using bundled attributes are reported in
Exhibit 2a. They are compared, for completeness, to a one-line regression that
makes no distinctions between submarkets and aggregates all households into a
single model. Critical to our argument, the pooled regression (Exhibit 2b) displays
almost no explanatory value for this model. As predicted, a low R2 (0.08) suggests
a large share of the variance in home prices in this neighborhood would be
explained by household diversity. We argue that a ‘‘one neighborhood, one type’’
regression assumption could easily mispecify an hedonic equation. Indeed, when
the analyst accounts for household diversity, R2 improves considerably (0.32) for
this study and even more (R2  0.43) in a prior study using a somewhat larger
set of regressors (Lipscomb and Farmer, 2005).
The role of Exhibit 2a in forming hypotheses is discussed below; but results
estimate iq as the price elasticity to a unit change in an attribute index, i,f o r446  Farmer and Lipscomb
Exhibit 2a  SUR with Composite Goods (N  357)
System R2  0.32
Index Coeff. Z-Stat. Prob.
Type A Structure 0.073 1.46 .148
Location 0.032 0.46 .645
Adjacency 0.066 0.95 .344
Constant 11.46 12.20 .000
Type B Structure 0.046 2.26 .025
Location 0.085 1.61 .109
Adjacency 0.038 2.40 .017
Constant 12.71 15.50 .000
Type C Structure 0.013 0.84 .400
Location 0.001 0.05 .963
Adjacency 0.098 3.66 .000
Constant 11.78 46.31 .000
Exhibit 2b  One Line Regression with Composite Goods (N  357)
R2  0.08
Index Coeff. Z-Stat. Prob. F statistic RMSE
Structure 0.013 3.23 .001
Location 0.005 1.92 .056 11.01 .427
Adjacency 0.007 0.55 .581 (p  .000)
Constant 11.79 424.98 .000
submarket q. So in submarket q, a 1% change in the size of an attribute index, i,
leads to a iq percent change in expected sales price. This approach is consistent
with household production theory where sets of housing amenities supply different
services to the household that complement other purchases outside the housing
market. For example, bundles of kitchen amenities complement food purchases or
bundles of indoor/outdoor spaces complement other recreation purchases
(Lancaster, 1966). So we do not impose iqi  1, which would impose the
assumption that attributes serve only narrow housing needs rather than broader
household services. Yet this functional form for indexing does impose weak
separability (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), whereby elements within a single
index are partially substitutable (e.g., fewer bedrooms for greater square footage),
but trade-offs across indexes are traded-off only as a group (e.g., less structureUsing Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  447
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for better location), regardless of the element in each group responsible for the
increase or decrease.
The critical test for submarket competition is whether some iq realize unusual
values in the price ranges of competition between types. Speciﬁc hypotheses
regarding which iq are expected to display high or low values in the competitive
price ranges are generated and tested by quantile analyses described below.
Generating Hypotheses for Attribute Index Estimates
We expect to observe a submarket premium, deﬁned as a higher than average iq
coefﬁcient, to be paid for at least one of the bundled attributes when a member
of a submarket successfully occupies the property. If there is no competition
between submarkets in these price ranges, then no change (or premium) in the
values of any amenity bundles would be observed. If an amenity is not active in
resolving competition between submarkets, no premium is expected to be observed
for that particular amenity.
We also allow for negative attribute amenity predictions, where a type frequently
loses bidding contests with another type. Some types may succeed by offering a
premium for a highly valued amenity; they may also succeed by accepting some
diminution in a lower valued amenity. As a speciﬁc example, established
households and students order preferences for adjacency very similarly—or, their
rankings from best to least preferred conditions of the immediate neighborhood
on Exhibit 2a are similar, but the magnitude for established households is higher.
Students may succeed in a bidding contest with established households by offering
a premium for favorable structural features but also by accepting a slightly inferior
set of adjacency features. Given the premium price paid for the structural amenities
to outbid established households, any multicollinearity among attributes that exists
(which we expect with so relatively few observations) would appear as if the
agents were paying more for a less attractive array of adjacency features. We posit
six such ‘spurious’ negative attribute values in our results.
We subdivide the price distribution for each submarket into ﬁve quantiles
(quantiles 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9). Direct observation reveals three price ranges
where submarkets realize similar marginal prices. These constitute the candidate
ranges for possible cross-type competition:
1. Price Quantile 0.3 for Type A overlaps with Price Quantile 0.1 for Type
B;
2. Price Quantile 0.9 for Type A overlaps with Price Quantiles 0.5 and 0.7
for Type C; and
3. Price Quantile 0.9 for Type B overlaps with Price Quantile 0.1 for Type
C.
If premiums paid in competition are responsible for much of the price variation
within a submarket, prior results including the attribute value estimates on Exhibit448  Farmer and Lipscomb
Exhibit 3  Summary of Hypotheses Predicting Positive Premiums
Submarket Type Hypothesis One-Tail Test Outcome (p-value)
Type A 1. Structure, Location and
Adjacency Premium Paid at
Quantile 0.3
Type A: STRUCTURE  0.14 (0.034)**
Type A: LOCATION  0.09 (0.173)
Type A: ADJACENCY  0.17 (0.093)*
Type A 2. Structure Premium Paid at
Quantile 0.9
Type A: STRUCTURE  0.16 (0.088)*
Type B 3. Location Premium Paid at
Quantile 0.1
Type B: LOCATION  0.12 (0.038)***
Type B 4. Location Premium Paid at
Quantile 0.9
Type B: LOCATION  0.15 (0.078)*
Type C 5. Adjacency Premium Paid at
Quantiles 0.5 and 0.7
0.5 Quantile
Type C: ADJACENCY  0.14 (0.000)***
0.7 Quantile
Type C: ADJACENCY  0.16 (0.000)***
Type C 6. Adjacency Premium Paid at
Quantile 0.1
Type C: ADJACENCY  0.09 (0.003)***
Note:
*Signiﬁcant at the .10 level for hypothesized one-tail tests.
**Signiﬁcant at the .05 level for hypothesized one-tail tests.
***Signiﬁcant at the .01 level for hypothesized one-tail tests.
2a in each submarket help to generate speciﬁc hypotheses regarding which
premiums for attributes in which submarkets are expected to be observed.
The total number of hypotheses is 18. There are three attributes for each submarket
in a given range of competition along with two submarkets engaged in competition
in each particular range. With three overlapping price ranges, this makes for 18
speciﬁc hypotheses in speciﬁc competitive price ranges overall. The column of
hypotheses listed in Exhibit 3 includes eight outcomes where we expect
statistically signiﬁcant positive premiums for speciﬁc attributes, organized into six
groups (two competitive ranges for each of the three types). The other ten are not
listed; but we hypothesize that there will be the realization of six negative attribute
values and four attributes not expected to play any role in resolving competition.
The hypotheses, listed as Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 6, in Exhibit 3 are discussed
in order.
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Student renters in this neighborhood occupy some
very expensive homes (and some of the cheapest). Therefore, it is no surprise that
attributes may not show evidence of overall signiﬁcance if students compete with
other submarkets at the low end and at the high end of their housing price range
in this market, realizing premiums at both ends of the distribution. At low prices,Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  449
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the lowest in the neighborhood, we expect students will be concerned with
avoiding bads, which generates Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: At quantile 0.3, students compete with and largely succeed in
outbidding young professionals, Type B. Therefore, we expect all three attributes
(location, immediate neighborhood conditions, and structural features) to
demonstrate a positive premium.
At high quantiles, we expect students to value the structural amenities and to pay
a premium for this attribute at those high quantiles. Though the structure variable
is only close to signiﬁcant overall (t-statistic  1.46) on Exhibit 2a, our hypothesis
that this attribute may exert a uniquely high inﬂuence at the highest price levels.
This would be consistent with the initial result. Since established households are
likely to care more about adjacency, or the mix of their immediate and nearby
neighbors (which are similar in ranking to students but stronger in magnitude),
we expect the following results from students who occupy property in this price
range:
Hypothesis 2: At quantile 0.9, students compete with and occasionally outbid
established households, Type C. Therefore, we expect the structural attribute to
demonstrate a positive premium.
As student renters and established households rank adjacency attributes similarly,
but established households demonstrate a stronger marginal preference, we also
expect at quantile 0.9 a negative and lower than average attribute value for
adjacency for student renters.
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. Results on Exhibit 2a suggest Type B young
professionals, often with young families, value location conveniences as the
particular feature they value strongly enough to make them competitive in this
real estate market. Lack of within-submarket diversity by young professionals
suggests they lose most bidding contests; and as such, they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
penetrate the market beyond the two bedroom/one bath homes they occupy. On
both sides of the competition, small increases in structural features such as a
bedroom, bathroom, or overall square footage makes the unit more attractive to
students who value occupancy or to established households who value space (for
a bedroom converted ofﬁce), convenience (bathroom), or recreation (square
footage and lot size). Similarly, immediate neighborhood conditions matter to
students for safety reasons and to established households for aesthetics. Yet
location is important to young professionals. Young professionals are observed to
occupy units with access to close-by convenience shopping and to road network
connections to multiple downtown locations.
Hypothesis 3: At quantile 0.1, young professionals compete with and occasionally
succeed in outbidding student renters, Type A. Therefore, we expect the location
attribute to demonstrate a positive premium.
From the narrow position of Type B in this market and results on Exhibit 2a, at
quantile 0.1 we expect a negative and lower than average attribute value for
structure and adjacency attributes.450  Farmer and Lipscomb
Hypothesis 4: At quantile 0.9, young professionals compete with and occasionally
succeed in outbidding established households, Type C. Therefore, we expect the
location attribute to demonstrate a positive premium at that quantile.
From the narrow position of Type B in this market and results on Exhibit 2a, at
quantile 0.9 we expect a negative and lower than average attribute value for
structure and adjacency attributes.
Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. Exhibit 2a also provides information about
established households (Type C). These households occupy units almost wholly
at or above the median home price in the neighborhood. We expect adjacency
attributes to be positive and signiﬁcant as these households search for pockets of
improved homes occupied largely by other established households. That
expectation is borne out by the adjacency index variable.
Hypothesis 5: At quantiles 0.5 and 0.7, established households compete with and
often succeed in outbidding student renters, Type A. Therefore, we expect the
adjacency attribute to demonstrate a positive premium.
In competition with young professionals at quantile 0.1, we also expect:
Hypothesis 6: At quantile 0.1, established households compete with and largely
succeed in outbidding young professionals, Type B. Therefore, we expect the
adjacency attribute to demonstrate a positive premium.
As established households and young professionals rank location attributes
similarly, but young professionals demonstrate a stronger marginal preference, we
also expect at quantile 0.1 a negative and lower than average attribute value for
location for established households.
Finally, we generate four speciﬁc hypotheses of no effect on attribute values due
to competition in the ranges of potential competition. For Type A student renters,
we do not expect Location at quantile 0.9 to differ from average values. Similarly,
for Type C established households, we do not expect Structure at quantile 0.1 to
differ from average values; and we do not expect Type C Structure and Location
at quantiles 0.5 and 0.7 to differ from average values.
Since only certain price ranges are relevant for each submarket, we now employ
quantile regression analysis to test our hypotheses.
 Quantile Regression Methodology
A quantile regression generates a different coefﬁcient value estimate for each
independent variable at different levels (quantiles) of the dependent variable. A
premium is consistent with a higher coefﬁcient value at a predicted price than at
others. The seminal work on quantile regression is Koenker and Bassett (1978).
Since then, this method also has been used to estimate the demand for electricity
(Hendricks and Koenker, 1991), to estimate stock market returns via a CapitalUsing Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  451
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Asset Pricing Model (Barnes and Hughes, 2002), and to estimate relationships in
the ﬁeld of ecology (Cade and Noon, 2003). The method of quantile regression
is based on the minimization of a weighted sum of the absolute deviations,
k
min y  bx h, (3)   ij j , i i
k {b } ij 0 jj 0
to estimate conditional quantile functions.4 Here, the weight hi is deﬁned as hi 
2q if the residual for the ith observation is strictly positive or as hi  2  2q if
the residual for the ith observation is negative or zero, where q varies between
zero and one and is the quantile to be predicted.
We employ ﬁve quantiles in this analysis (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9). It is
important to remember that a quantile regression is an efﬁciency correction,
similar to generalized least squares (GLS) or spatial weights matrices (SWM).
Quantile regressions are estimated simultaneously; so the degrees of freedom are
not calculated by quantile but as a system. If there are ﬁve quantiles, n
observations in the entire sample and m variables, the degrees of freedom for the
quantile estimator is n  (m  5). Therefore, an individual quantile may have
only nm observations that can fall below m  5 with no loss of efﬁciency; it is a
system estimator.
 Results
Exhibit 4 reports the estimated coefﬁcients for each of the ﬁve quantiles by each
submarket. It also reports the mean value of each attribute across quantiles for
each submarket for use in comparison. Exhibit 4 highlights for each submarket
the quantiles that are active in cross-type competition (e.g., 0.3 and 0.9 for Type
A). It also highlights which speciﬁc attribute estimates in those quantiles are
expected to show a positive attribute value premium.
In addition to stating hypotheses, Exhibit 3 reports the level of statistical
signiﬁcance of the posed one-tail test for hypotheses. Hypothesis 1, as an example,
ﬁnds that the estimated structure coefﬁcient rejects the null hypothesis of no
premium for the attribute at quantile 0.1 with 96.9% conﬁdence.
Overall, seven of the eight speciﬁc attribute positive premiums expected that are
listed in Exhibit 3 reject the null with at least 90% conﬁdence (the hypotheses
for quantiles 0.5 and 0.7 for Type C collapse to one hypothesis, Hypothesis 5,
with two test points). For Hypothesis 1, only the location attribute for Type A
student renters was expected to show a signiﬁcantly positive premium but did not.
The location coefﬁcient on Exhibit 4 (and Exhibit 5) displays high variability
across quantiles for Type A, which may obscure any difference; yet location on452  Farmer and Lipscomb
Exhibit 4  Quantile Regression Estimates
Panel A: Type A Households (N  68)
QUANTILE 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
CONSTANT 13.96 10.32 10.98 11.74 13.36
STRUCTURE INDEX 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.16
LOCATION INDEX 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00
ADJACENCY INDEX 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.20
Panel B: Type B Households (N  160)
QUANTILE 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
CONSTANT 12.41 10.87 11.74 11.73 14.41
STRUCTURE INDEX 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02
LOCATION INDEX 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15
ADJACENCY INDEX 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05
Panel C: Type C Households (N  129)
QUANTILE 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
CONSTANT 10.93 11.09 11.35 12.39 12.26
STRUCTURE INDEX 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02
LOCATION INDEX 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
ADJACENCY INDEX 0.12 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.03
Exhibit 4 (and illustrated in Exhibit 5) is still far higher than the average value
for location by Type A.
Next, Exhibits 5–7 provide a visual display of the estimates for each submarket
type across ﬁve quantiles that are recorded in Exhibit 4.
In an initial focus group (of students only), students living in lower priced units
expressed concern for location and for the condition of immediate neighbors
(adjacency) while students living in higher priced homes expressed concerns for
high occupancy and clean, newer units. This would seem to be borne out,
represented by results on Exhibit 6.
Hypothesis 1: Students avoid ‘bads’ at low quantile prices, which conforms to
student focus group statements.
We expect they will display a premium for all three attribute bundles at quantile
0.3. Only location failed to realize a signiﬁcant premium, perhaps due to the low
Location value at quantile 0.1 (affecting the variance around the mean value for
location).Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  453
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Exhibit 5  Coefﬁcients on Hedonic Indices for Submarket C Households
Exhibit 6  Coefﬁcients on Hedonic Indices for Submarket A Households454  Farmer and Lipscomb
Exhibit 7  Coefﬁcients on Hedonic Indices for Submarket B Households
Hypothesis 2: Students pay a premium for features that favor high occupancy.
At quantile 0.9, the structure coefﬁcient value realizes a premium as hypothesized
with 91.2% conﬁdence. These more expensive, higher occupancy homes (mostly
four-bedroom with a few ﬁve-bedroom homes) tend to appear in clusters, which
would indicate less concern for Adjacency and Location at the higher price end.
In competition with Type C, students trade-off newer, high occupancy units against
adjacency and location valued at lower quantiles.5 The negative attribute value
predicted for adjacency at 0.9 is also observed on Exhibit 6. With similar but
weaker preferences for adjacency than Type C, student renters combine offers of
higher bids with reductions in adjacency to successfully compete with established
households.
Type B young professionals occupy a narrow range of local housing stock—two
bedroom, one bath homes almost exclusively. They value location as a weighted
index that shows preferences for being close to convenience stores, the university,
and major thoroughfares. Exhibit 7 illustrates a clear positive value for location
at the tails where competition occurs.
Hypothesis 3: The predicted Type B premium for location is displayed at quantile
0.3.Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  455
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Hypothesis 4: The predicted Type B premium for location is displayed at quantile
0.9.
There are also four weak hypotheses regarding Type B (not listed in Exhibit 3).
The structure and adjacency attributes could be signiﬁcantly negative at quantiles
0.1 and 0.9. Three of these four are signiﬁcantly negative above the 90%
conﬁdence level—the negative value for structure at quantile 0.9 is still negative
but not statistically signiﬁcant.
Type C households prefer to be adjacent to their own type and discount at different
levels of intensity adjacency to other types. Illustrated in Exhibit 5, regression
results show a strong positive value for adjacency at prices where competition
occurs.
Hypothesis 5: The predicted Type C premium for adjacency is displayed at
quantile 0.1.
Hypothesis 6: The predicted Type C premium for adjacency is displayed at
quantiles 0.5 and 0.7.
The negative value predicted for location is demonstrated in Exhibit 5. As
established households and young professionals rank location attributes similarly,
but young professionals show a stronger preference magnitude, established
households at their lowest quantile outbid young professionals by offering a
combination of higher bids for adjacency with modest reduction in location to
compete successfully.
The quantile results for this market tend to conform to the prior SUR submarket
estimates of Lipscomb and Farmer (2005) and attest to the beneﬁt of attribute
bundling and quantile regression analysis. Where competition is expected, our
hypotheses that certain types are willing to pay higher than average implicit values
for speciﬁc bundles to resolve cross-submarket competition are supported
empirically.
Implications for Investors
Since the ﬁrst collection of the data for this study in 2002, two proﬁtable trends
in real estate improvements and development have accelerated. Many of the
highest valued two bedroom, one bath homes (Type B) have been improved by
home additions—an added bathroom or bedroom. That these investments arise
near other high value Type B or Type C (established household) houses suggests
that when these units enjoy favorable adjacency features, strategic home additions
yield a high return. Similarly, conversion or often demolition of the lowest priced
Type B homes to build new and larger homes for student renters have been
proﬁtable. New, large homes built in areas where the immediate neighborhood
creates less attractive adjacency features seems risky; but consistent with results456  Farmer and Lipscomb
here, if structural features favor high occupancy, students will pay a substantial
premium to occupy those units anyway.
The quantile results here are very important for developers. Very expensive student
houses tend to become their own immediate neighborhood. A cluster of low value
student housing mixed with lower valued young professional homes is a very
different neighborhood than a cluster of newly improved and larger student homes
with well-lighted front areas.
Real estate investors could proﬁtably expand several adjacent student units in very
low valued student areas or remodel lower valued young professionals’ homes
surrounded by other established households. Signiﬁcantly, these nuanced and local
real estate market structures are often considered out of reach of hedonic analysis;
yet with modest effort they arise in our results.
Results explain real world investors’ choices regarding whether or not to upgrade
and to remodel Type B homes by adding a bath or bedroom. Results explain why
investors occasionally upgrade or remodel these homes as they can realize a
premium, not from the young professionals currently living in these units but from
students to whom they can now rent these units. For cases where homes are rebuilt
as larger 4–5 bedroom homes, these developments violated zoning until recently;
but now they seem to generate positive externalities to the rest of the
neighborhood. At times even established households bid for these units.
For such a small data set and the local diversity examined, it would be hard to
imagine a more consistent statistical performance. As diversity becomes a policy
objective for urban areas, such as New Urbanism, the identiﬁcation and the
stability of local diversity rises as a real estate market concern, and a critical policy
objective. As the scales of most of these initiatives are considerably larger than
the local market examined here, presumably results in a similarly diverse market
setting would be even sharper.
 Conclusion
Smaller scale hedonic price analyses face numerous obstacles: lack of local
amenity variation, small numbers of observations, generally less demographic
variation, and time to complete such a detailed study. Yet, with some effort we
can evaluate areas that retain local diversity by improving the quality of
information regarding each observation, namely better demographic information.
Part of the concern regards what is to be evaluated. At the local level, we show
that a great deal of local real estate market structure can be identiﬁed that allows
the analyst to assess what clusters of characteristics place a unit in competition
between two different household types and how that competition is resolved. This
provides direct information on strategic house remodeling or property investment.
Here, among 357 observations, exist three separate submarkets with clearly
deﬁnable demographic distinctions that rationalize the submarkets identiﬁed.Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  457
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Competition between submarkets appears only in speciﬁc price ranges, or house
price quantiles, for each submarket as we might expect. The premiums required
to be the highest bidder in cross-submarket competition skew the variance in
housing prices within a given submarket in response to changes in attribute
clusters. It is this insight that rewards our effort in modeling a local real estate
market.
The strong improvement in overall explanatory power for the entire market due
to the introduction of the SUR estimator, from 0.10 to 0.32 [or to 0.42 using a
few more unbundled individual variables included in Lipscomb and Farmer
(2005)], shows the value of the submarket articulation. Consistent with cross-type
competition, more of the movement in prices is explained by the need at times
for groups to pay a premium to prevail in that competition. Consistent with cross-
type competition, a Vickery auction model predicts that prevailing over the second
highest bidder from another submarket can require a more profound premium, one
that arises usually due to a single class of attributes rather than all attributes, such
as the preference for multiple bedrooms in large homes by students. The quantile
analyses above show surprising conformity with a price premium paid for
attributes as being strongly marked at those very speciﬁc prices ranges where
submarkets might compete.
Given the data size and market diversity, some parsimony is required to conduct
these analyses. Bundling of attributes into service clusters—Structure, Location,
and Adjacency—allows us to use quantile regression analysis to capture cross-
market competition effects on housing price. The high conformity in the
performance of speciﬁc quantile predictions at speciﬁc home price quantiles shows
promise for future real estate research.
Lastly, our results mimic in a larger sense observed patterns in larger hedonic
studies. Large price variation across a space occurs in part due to demographic or
preference diversity among groups of residents. The variance within a group is
quite small due the homogeneity of preferences within group. This allows the
analyst to measure the average price response to an amenity change. Yet there
may be lessons here for much larger hedonic studies. To the extent that large
studies show considerable parameter instability, even changing sign from study to
study in the same market, they do so with especially attractive diagnostic features:
very high individual parameter statistical signiﬁcance, very high R2 statistics, and
in the largest studies almost undetectable multicollinearity. The patterns observed
may signal more about what is measured: overall price variation across a large
market with many diverse submarkets.
A key goal of this work is to establish the prima facie case that a high level of
submarket diversity can exist in an urban neighborhood and that these markets
interact with sufﬁcient vigor to impact price variation. Hedonic analyses for many
uses will have to attend more closely to this issue, using revised tools and
estimation strategies that are theoretically consistent with the market phenomenon.
While this work does not value each sub-attribute for each submarket, nor does458  Farmer and Lipscomb
it intend such an outcome, the larger concern for market structure and pricing
patterns does reveal an important level of diversity that affect markets of concern
to research.
It is unclear at this time how much this inﬂuences large hedonic price studies; but
the results suggest that the largest sources of variation come from sorting
submarkets into different types of households and then from understanding more
about how those types interact in that market. More work to individualize
parameter estimates for different respondents such as random coefﬁcients models
will extend the work here to sort groups into distinct submarkets. The beneﬁts of
such individualization of hedonic price estimates should be revealing, as the
implications of tying household demographics to more favorable housing
characteristics are important to real estate developers seeking to alter the local
housing supply and investors seeking to diversify their real estate portfolios.
 Endnotes
1 Condominium owners seem to be an emerging fourth type (as they have above average
Z-scores compared to all other Type C households) with the ‘‘mindset’’ or ‘‘lifestyle’’ of
owners but the physical dwelling characteristics of Type B residents. Given the small
number of condominium owners in this dataset (23), we do not have enough observations
to classify them as a fourth household type.
2 Many individual elements in the index from the SUR were not signiﬁcant. F-tests
comparing results with and without groups of insigniﬁcant variables revealed signiﬁcant
loss of information at the 95% level when only signiﬁcant elements were used to create
each attribute index. This signiﬁcance in the group clustered effect is a key motivation
for variable clustering.
3 We observe a key control for scaling effects that can induce spurious heterogeneity across
the range of dwelling prices is the choice of a double-log functional form for all
continuous variables in the hedonic equations. An effect that alters the price of a $500,000
dwelling by $10,000 is clearly proportionally less inﬂuenced by that attribute change
than a $100,000 dwelling that realizes the same $10,000 improvement. Instead of
regressing raw housing price against dwelling attributes, we regress percentage shifts in
the dependent variable against percentage changes in the continuous independent
variables; so our coefﬁcient estimates are expressed as elasticities.
4 This quasi-artiﬁcial segmentation of the dependent variable (sales price) by quantiles
should not be misinterpreted as support for the segmentation of households along a single
dimension, a mistake made and realized by Rosen (1974). Even Heckman (1979) argues
that any dependent variable truncation may create biased parameter estimates and should
be avoided.
5 The only other unexpected attribute elasticity is location for Type A at quantile 0.1. We
had no prior theory, but the result is not inconsistent with a trade-off among these lowest
quality and lowest valued units. It seems that adjacency (which students attach to safety)
and structure (which students in these areas associate with functionality) would also show
a trade-off against location (which students associate with convenience).Using Quantile Regression in Hedonic Analysis  459
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